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SCORING RULES AND ABNORMALLY LOW BIDS CRITERIA IN 
CONSTRUCTION TENDERS: A TAXONOMIC REVIEW 
Abstract 
In the global construction context, the Best Value or Most Economically 
Advantageous Tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, 
as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the Lowest Price. In 
these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing 
both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, 
each bidder's price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, 
generally called an Economic Scoring Formula (ESF) and a technical score 
according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder 
with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, Economic 
Scoring Formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly 
intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, 
despite having being considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its 
mathematical nature.  
This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESF and 
Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different 
tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price 
scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects 
of ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour. 
 
Keywords: Bidding; Tendering; Competitiveness; International comparison; 
Scoring rule. 
 
 
Introduction 
Competitive tendering1 is the conventional method for procuring major construction 
projects such as building, infrastructure and shipbuilding. The need to guarantee 
transparency, publicity and equal opportunity in public procurement demands clear 
procedures to be followed by bidders (de Boer et al., 2001; Falagario et al., 2012) in 
order to reduce the risk of unfair bias or corruption (Auriol, 2006; Celentani and 
Ganuza, 2002). 
The simplest, most transparent and effective means of doing this is by what is 
usually termed the traditional method, in which the contract is awarded to the lowest 
bidder (Waara and Bröchner, 2006; Wang et al., 2006). This method provides the 
best motivation for project cost reduction (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) and 
predominates in both public and private sectors in the United States (Art et al., 
2012), Europe (Bergman and Lundberg, 2013; Rocha de Gouveia, 2002) and many 
other countries worldwide. 
Despite its widespread use, however, the traditional lowest bid method is 
considered by many to be a recipe for trouble (Holt et al., 1994a; Williams, 2003), 
especially in an oversupplied market (Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Oviedo-Haito et 
al., 2014). Factors such as shortage of contracts, difficulties in prescribing and 
measuring the quality of work, uncertainty of future costs and potential for claims, 
encourage a situation where the lowest bid is often not the best bid in terms of price ( 
Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Wong et al., 2001), time (Lambropoulos, 2007; Shr and 
Chen, 2003) and quality (Asker and Cantillon, 2008; Molenaar and Johnson, 2003). 
1 To avoid confusion, the terms “auction” and “tender” will be used here as synonymous, as well as 
“auctioneer”, “client”, “owner” and “contracting authority”. Strictly speaking, the words 
“construction auctions” in this study do not refer to “classical auctions” where the highest bidder 
often wins, but actually to “procurement auctions” or “reverse auctions”, which are a common type of 
auction in which the roles of the buyer (client, owner, auctioneer or contracting authority) and the 
seller (bidders or tenderers) are reversed with the primary objective to drive purchase prices 
downward. 
 
 
                                                 
In contrast with the construction industry's devotion to the traditional method ( 
Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000; Wang et al., 2006), selection of the best 
price-quality bidder has been promoted for a long time, with early work dating back 
to 1968 (Simmonds, 1968). This involves also taking non-price or technical/quality 
factors into consideration in obtaining an optimum outcome for the contracting 
authority, the owner or the auctioneer (Wang et al., 2013), i.e. the best value for 
money (Holt et al., 1995). For this, the auctioneer seeks to maximize the owner’s 
value for a certain budget (price). Generally, this change of paradigm is named Best 
Value in the U.S. (Molenaar and Johnson, 2003) and the Most Economically 
Advantageous Tender (MEAT or EMAT) in the EU and other parts of the world 
(Bergman and Lundberg, 2013).  
In short, the implementation of this awarding approach requires the 
technical/quality and economic proposals of bidders to be scored and weighed to 
allow the auctioneer to rank them and identify the most economically advantageous 
tender. The problem lies in knowing how the economic scoring affects the bidders’ 
aggressive/conservative behaviour (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012a), the bias or 
unfairness of bidder ranking, or how even facilitates collusion among competitors 
(Dini et al., 2006). However, no attempts have been made to date to propose a 
unified classification of the current economic scoring rules (named here as Economic 
Scoring Formulas, or ESF) that affect the bid price, to differentiate them from the 
technical/quality bid factors that are also scored and weighed in order to award a 
contract (not addressed in this study). 
A clear ESF classification or taxonomy is generally a first-order requirement to 
homogenize ongoing research and allow future developments in almost any 
discipline, but most likely the countries’ different paradigms concerning bidding 
and awarding criteria and the traditional common belief considering these rules as 
 
“given” and “immutable” might have had a strong influence in keeping such a 
unified ESF taxonomy from being effectively developed (Ballesteros-Pérez and 
Skitmore, 2014). Therefore, a taxonomic review is presented of the mathematical 
expressions for the ESF used in many countries to convert the economic component 
(bid price) of proposals into scores. In order to do this, a comprehensive review of 
several countries’bidding practices is analysed and their common features 
summarized into a single parametric model that includes both the ESF themselves 
along with the Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC) responsible for setting a price 
threshold for identifying unrealistically low bids. The findings of this research will 
contribute to improved ESF and ALBC selection by auctioneers in the future and to 
expand new research - raising awareness about aspects that still need to be treated in 
scoring rule bidding. 
In order to achieve this goal, the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
provides a literature review structured into two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
introduces the weighted scoring method, while the second deals with the different 
components that comprise the scoring rules. In the following section, two important 
tender aspects are highlighted: the difference between the ranking and scoring rules, 
and the difference between capped and uncapped tenders. Later, a conceptual 
framework is proposed in the form of a taxonomic classification, taking into 
consideration the scoring parameters actually implemented by the ESF; ALBC are 
also analysed at this point. Finally, a discussion of the results is then included, where 
an effect deeply related to the ESF mathematical configuration, named apparent or 
phony economic bid weighting, is also highlighted and studied. 
 
Literature review 
 
Weighted scoring method 
Under different denominations, most public international procurement laws and 
guidelines (e.g. EU, 2004; EuropeAID, 2014; UN, 2006, 2011; WB, 2011) provide 
two main contract awarding approaches, namely: a price-only (lowest price) criterion 
or weighted multiple criteria (MEAT or BV) (Dini et al., 2006). Generally, the 
lowest price is recommended for procurement, where the technical specifications or 
statement of works, as well as bill of quantities, are clear (Dini et al., 2006). On the 
other hand, a weighted multiple criteria approach is used for more complex 
procurement where the evaluation requires a number of criteria other than price to be 
considered and balanced in order to ensure best value for money and where there are 
different types of scales to be used for the various elements of the offer (Dini et al., 
2006). For this reason, these auctions or tenders are often called multi-attribute or 
multi-dimensional. 
The need for weighting and scoring economic criteria or price-related factors 
(e.g. life cycle costs, cost of maintenance, decommission costs) along with technical 
criteria (e.g. compliance, time, availability, quality) is because they are part of a 
mathematical expression that determines (theoretically) the best return on investment 
of the procurement of goods, works or services for the owner (Asker and Cantillon, 
2010). Whenever a weighted scoring method is implemented, the owner, contracting 
authority or auctioneer must specify beforehand in the tender specifications both the 
criteria and the weights with which the bidders’ proposals will be evaluated. As a 
general rule, weighted scoring methods can be expressed as: 
 { } iitiei TWSWO δ⋅+⋅=  (1) 
where: 
iO  is the overall score achieved by bidder i  (with Ni ,...,2,1=  bidders) in a tender. 
 
eW  is the weight of the economic criteria for tenders for similar projects. In general, 
eW  is pre-set by the auctioneer within 10 ≤≤ eW . When 1=eW , the tender is 
awarded to the lowest price bidder. 
iS  is bidder i ’s economic score that is calculated according to bidder i ’s submitted 
economic bid and by means of the Economic Scoring Formula (ESF) pre-set by 
the auctioneer. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that 10 ≤≤ iS , but 
this variable is also usually expressed by a score, for example 1000 ≤≤ iS  
points. 
tW  is the weight of the technical criteria. In general, tW  is also pre-set by the 
auctioneer and, since whenever there are no special tender requirements 
et WW −=1 , it is also the case that 10 ≤≤ tW . Analogously, when 1=tW  the 
tender is awarded exclusively according to the technical criteria; these tenders 
are sometimes called beauty contests (Bergman & Lundberg, 2013). 
iT  is bidder i ’s technical score that is calculated according to a set of rules, scales or 
rates for the different attributes that interest the owner or auctioneer. Again, it is 
assumed that 10 ≤≤ iT , but this variable can also be expressed as the sum of 
several technical and/or quality aspects that are also usually scored in points. 
iδ  is an abnormality index that equals 1 when bidder i ’s bid is above (more 
expensive) than the threshold defined by the Abnormally Low Bids Criterion 
(ALBC), allowing the bidder to compete, and which equals 0 if this condition is 
not fulfilled. Whenever 0=iδ , bidder i ’s bid is cheaper than the ALBC or, in 
other words, unrealistically low and, therefore, disqualified. iδ  is calculated 
according to another mathematical expression, named the Abnormally Low Bid 
Criterion (ALBC), which is generally independent of the ESF. 
 
 Components of the scoring rules 
Having defined mathematically the weighted scoring methods, there are four aspects 
that can be analysed: (a) the way the economic score is calculated (variable iS , i.e., 
the ESF); (b) the way the technical score is calculated (variable iT ); (c) the way the 
weights are set (relative importance of variables eW  and tW  to each other or even 
the sub-weights within each economic and technical proposal); and, finally, (d) how 
the ALBC is defined (variable iδ ). This study will focus later only on ESF and 
ALBC (variables iS  and iδ ). 
To date, many researchers have dealt with defining the technical factors, iT , to be 
taken into consideration in BV/MEAT selection (e.g. Holt et al., 1994a, 1994b; 
Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000; Shen et al., 2004; Waara and Bröchner, 
2006). 
With regard to the economic and technical weight values (variables eW  and tW ), 
the most common approach is the linear weighting method (EU, 2004), where the 
auctioneer assigns a weight to each criterion in advance. Considered in this way, the 
issue then becomes one of solving a multi-criteria decision-making problem 
concerning the weights of several factors (Hatush and Skitmore, 1998; Holt et al., 
1994c; Pongpeng and Liston, 2003; Wang et al., 2013). Furthermore, Jennings and 
Holt (1998) define multi-criteria decision-making as a “selection based on evaluation 
of tender submissions against criteria predetermined by auctioneers and considered 
important by them in terms of achieving successful project completion”. Additional 
techniques have been applied by other researchers, including multi attribute analysis 
(Holt et al., 1994b, 1994c), the analytic hierarchy process (Pastor-Ferrando et al., 
2010; Wang et al., 2013), fuzzy sets (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2012), case-based 
 
reasoning models (Dikmen et al., 2007), neural networks (Chaovalitwongse et al., 
2012), and data envelopment analysis (Falagario et al., 2012). 
However, despite the extensive scientific literature focused on ensuring the best 
balance of economic and technical weights, the weights to be disclosed in requests 
for proposals are still currently based on subjective judgments (Lorentziadis, 2010). 
Fixed criterion weights ensure objectivity and reduce the risk of unfairness and 
corruption in the evaluation of bidders’ proposals, but only provided they accurately 
reflect the relative importance of the evaluation factors to the owner. However, it is 
still possible to create an unfair evaluation system in which too much emphasis is 
placed on particular evaluation factors, thus favouring – intentionally or 
unintentionally – those bidders that score highly in the corresponding factors 
(Lorentziadis, 2010). When weights are subjectively set and fixed before the bid 
process, the evaluation system is said to corresponds to a pre-subjective input model 
(Pongpeng and Liston, 2003). 
Two multi-attribute auction variables remain to be addressed: the Economic 
Scoring Formula (ESF, variable iS ) and the Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC, 
variable iδ ) which are the main concern of this paper for, as will be seen later, they 
can also significantly influence previous variables ( iT , eW  and tW ). 
The ESF, as already mentioned, is used to translate the bid prices proposed by 
the bidders into economic scores (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012b). Auctioneers tend 
to use similar or identical ESF for all their projects but different auctioneers use 
different ESF. ESFs also differ between countries. Waara and Bröchner (2006) and 
Fuentes-Bargues et al. (2014), for example, report a variety of different ESFs used 
by Swedish municipalities and Spanish public agencies. Nevertheless, in the highly 
competitive world of construction bidding, the ESF chosen is likely to have 
significant consequences on the outcome of the auction in terms of aggressiveness 
 
(very low bids to win the auction) or conservativeness (higher bids to avoid being 
disqualified as being unrealistic) of bidders and the outcome of the project 
(Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2001). 
However, very little is known of the relationship between ESFs and other 
multiple aspects of bidding behaviour. Consequently, ESF selection by auctioneers 
in practice is invariably a highly intuitive and subjective process (Holt et al., 1994b, 
1994c), involving few theoretical or empirical considerations. This produces scoring 
rules in practice that are often poorly designed (Bergman and Lundberg, 2013) and 
affected by internal consistency and validity problems (Borcherding et al., 1991); 
this situation is unfortunately shared with other tender documents and leading to cost 
estimate inaccuracy, claims and disputes (Laryea, 2011). 
Therefore, despite the extensive research on competitive bidding over the years 
(Holt, 2010; Oo et al., 2010), ESF selection is a relatively unresearched area. With 
very few exceptions, such as Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010), there is a paucity of 
research that bridges the gap between the theoretical analyses of abstract scoring 
rules and their practical application in procurement practice (Bergman and 
Lundberg, 2013). 
Likewise, unrealistically low bids have also received very little attention in the 
literature to date (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2013b; Chao and Liou, 2007). However, 
when we refer to Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC), we are not focusing on 
analysing the reason or even the features of bids considered too low to be acceptable. 
Instead, we refer to how the auctioneer defines mathematically, before receiving the 
bids, the value below which every bidder will be objectively disqualified when 
submitting a cheaper bid (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012a). For example, some 
countries define abnormally low bids by the arithmetic deviation from the average 
bid (ICC, 2000), even though there is no assurance that such methods accurately 
 
identify an actually unrealistically low bid (Chotibhongs and Arditi, 2012; EU, 
2002). 
On the other hand, many attempts have been made to propose objective statistical 
methods to determine the threshold below (or above) which a bid is considered to be 
abnormal. The problem is that all these methods are useful ex-post (after the tender 
deadline, and therefore not included in the tender specifications). Since everyone 
acknowledges that statistical methods are open to error and distortion, no successful 
(objective and indisputable) solution has been found so far (EU, 2002). 
Therefore, the definition of ALBC here only attempts to draw a line that will 
disqualify low bids; it does not intend to deal with auction rules to discourage 
collusion, as discussed in-depth in the scientific literature (Che and Kim, 2006, 2009; 
Chowdhury, 2008). ALBC are not always present, but the narrower they are, the 
more conservative the bids become in order to avoid being disqualified (Ballesteros-
Pérez et al., 2012b, 2013a). According to the specifications and procurement 
guidelines studied, the largest difference between countries lies in ALBC values 
used. 
Therefore, in addressing the problem of ESF and ALBC selection, a conceptual 
framework in the form of a taxonomic classification for both variables in 
construction auctions is first proposed, followed by some insights into its use. It is 
anticipated, therefore, that the findings of this research will contribute to improved 
ESF and ALBC selection by auctioneers in the future and to expand new research, 
raising awareness of the aspects still in need of treatment in the bidding scoring rule 
domain. 
 
Economic Scoring Formula (ESF) taxonomy 
 
In order to create a ESF taxonomy, several notation and methodological aspects 
need to be addressed to homogenise current knowledge of these scoring rules. 
First, a clear difference between a ranking and a scoring rule needs to be 
established. Ranking rules are used whenever the only awarding criterion is the 
price, whereas scoring rules are required in multi-attribute tenders to be able to 
combine their technical and economic components. Mathematical expressions are 
necessary for the latter kind of rules when it comes to converting the bid values into 
scores, which is the reason the approach taken is eminently mathematical. 
Second, the difference between capped and uncapped tenders needs to be 
recognised. This involves the setting (capped) or not (uncapped) of a maximum  
price for bids. It is important to distinguish between these two common bidding 
approaches as bidders behave differently in each of them, mainly because the ESFs 
and ALBC are also mathematically different. 
Third, a brief explanation is given just before the ESF taxonomy proposal about 
the international tender sources that allowed the study and review of a varied array of 
tender specifications, as well as national and international public procurement 
economic scoring methods. This aims to show that both the ESF and ALBC 
taxonomies are not arbitrary, but based on real-life and representative samples. 
Fourth, a taxonomy is finally proposed in terms of the variables contained in 
their mathematical expressions – the so-called Scoring Parameters (SPs) – as these 
are the only common trait shared across ESFs and ALBC. 
Fifth, the interrelationships among SPs in capped and uncapped tenders needs to 
be studied, in order to understand why differences in subsequent bidding behaviour 
are likely to be due to the implementation of different combinations of SPs in the 
ESFs and ALBC. 
 
Finally, a brief note is given on how ESFs and ALBC can be represented and that 
some of their features better understood graphically when expressed as a function of 
one of their SPs.  
 
Ranking versus scoring rules 
When price is the sole criterion in awarding a contract, there is no need to score 
the bids, since the auctioneer is only interested in ordering or ranking the bids 
received in terms of their value. There are many ranking rules, including: 
• Lowest-price, which is the most common in construction procurement 
(Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000). 
• Average bid method, in which the awarded bid is the closest to the average 
bid of all the bid prices for a project (Rocha de Gouveia, 2002). 
• Below-average bid method, where the closest to but less than the average bid 
wins the project (Ioannou and Awwad, 2010). 
• Truncated average bid or bid-spread method, where the winning bid is 
defined as the closest to the average computed after excluding outliers 
(Waara and Bröchner, 2006) 
However, a rank is not enough whenever bid prices are combined with technical 
criteria, and an ESF is needed to translate a bid price into a numerical score. These 
latter mathematical expressions form the basis of the taxonomy. 
 
Capped versus uncapped tenders 
In general, two dominant approaches concerning the price boundaries are 
identified: capped and uncapped tenders. In uncapped tenders, a bidder i  submits an 
economic bid ( ib ) which can range from 0 to ∞+ , unless an ALBC is 
 
implemented. Conversely, in capped tenders, a bidder i  submits a bid that is upper 
bounded (in price) by the auctioneer and therefore has no option but to equal or 
underbid this pre-set tender amount ( A ). Bids can therefore range from 0 to A , 
unless an ALBC is implemented. Capped tenders also exhibit the property that bids 
can be expressed in discounts or drops ( id ) off A , i.e. a bidder i ’s bid can be 
expressed as: 
 
A
bd ii −=1          or          ( )Adb ii −= 1  (2) 
Therefore, these discounts or drops can range from 0 to 1 in capped tenders. In 
addition, for clarification, the pre-set maximum economic tender amount ( A ), is 
sometimes called the ceiling price in the literature, whereas the term reserve price is 
identified with an ALBC only if stated in the tender specifications (Chowdhury, 
2008). Finally, as will be emphasized later, the most important difference between 
capped and uncapped tenders, beyond the way the bids are expressed, is that their 
respective ‘Scoring Parameters’ (variables to be introduced later that configure the 
ESF and ALBC mathematical expressions) behave in different ways. 
 
Existing tender practices 
The main goal of the current study is to propose an ESF and ALBC taxonomy, as 
both ESF and ALBC constitute the two major components of the economic bid score 
(variables iS  and iδ ). In order to achieve this, a wide range of ESFs and ALBC in 
current practice are needed to identify their common features. However, the 
economic and technical bid weightings that are normally used with ESF and ALBC (
eW  and tW  respectively) are also available for use in identifying shared bidding 
behaviour trends across countries, and from which the apparent of phony bid 
weighting phenomenon was deduced as explained later in the Discussion section. 
 
Therefore, in the first instance, a thorough review of tender specifications and 
national and international public procurement methods was made. This review 
consisted primarily of the compilation of ESF and ALBC implemented by 
contracting authorities or supranational entities (EU and some multilateral agencies) 
in various countries since, by registering those mathematical criteria it was possible 
to find common traits, especially among the Scoring Parameters.  
Discipline-related books, several international agencies commission reports as 
well as specific scientific publications also provided very valuable information and 
these were supplemented by real tendering data provided by multiple international 
construction contractors working in a wide range of countries. 
In terms of books and reports, Ballesteros-Pérez and Skitmore (2014) provide a 
wide survey of ESF used in Spain. Waara and Bröchner (2006) and Fuentes-Bargues 
et al. (2014) cover Swedish and Spanish ESF respectively currently in use by 
Contracting Authorities. Del Caño-Gochi et al. (2008) analyse and compile the most 
common procurement approaches and awarding criteria in France, the United States, 
United Kingdom and Japan. Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy (2000) describe a 
range of different economic factors and systems still in use by public agencies in the 
United States, Canada and Hong Kong. The EU (2002) sets a common framework 
with examples of how each country has customized ESF and ALBC according to its 
needs. Furthermore, multilateral agencies’ procurement guidelines, such as of the 
World Bank (WB, 2011), United Nations (UN, 2006), EuropeAID (EuropeAID, 
2014) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2009) were reviewed. 
Finally, we obtained a variety of examples of datasets of tender specifications 
and results from several international construction contractors in countries as diverse 
as Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Algiers, Morocco, Oman, Egypt, 
 
Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Australia, New Zealand and China. These tender 
specifications and bidding results also served the secondary purpose of the study, 
which was to determine the extent to which particular ESF and ALBC configurations 
forced bidders to behave in predictable ways. 
 
ESF taxonomy proposal 
The ESFs are mathematical expressions used to assign numerical scores ( iS ) to 
each bidder i ’s bid price. However, these mathematical expressions commonly make 
use of other sub-variables for converting the price into score. These sub-variables or 
Scoring Parameters (SP) are usually calculated as a function of the final distribution 
of bids (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012a). 
In uncapped tenders, the primary SPs are: the minimum bid ( minb ), which 
corresponds to the lowest bid; the maximum bid ( maxb ), which corresponds to the 
highest bid, the average bid ( mb ), which corresponds to the average of all bids 
submitted, and, even though it is uncommon to find it as a variable within an ESF, 
the number of bidders ( N ) (Ballesteros-Pérez and Skitmore, 2014). As an example, 
an ESF that gives the maximum score (1) to the lowest bidder, i.e. 1)1( =S , and the 
minimum score (generally 0) to the most expensive bidder, i.e. 0)( =NS , would be 
written as: 
minmax
max
bb
bbS ii −
−
=  
In capped tenders, the primary SPs are the same, but expressed in discounts or 
drops, that is: the maximum drop ( maxd ) corresponds to the lowest bid; the minimum 
drop ( mind ) corresponds to the highest bid; the average drop ( md ) corresponds to 
the average of all bids (expressed in drops) submitted; and, again, the number of 
 
bidders ( N ). The ESF example above can therefore be equally expressed in drops 
whenever there is a tender amount ( A ) as 
minmax
min
dd
ddS ii −
−
=  
Apart from the primary SPs, other frequently used measures include the standard 
deviation of the bids/drops ( s  in uncapped tenders and σ  in capped tenders) 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012a). 
As a result, although ESFs may or may not use a SP, in most cases they use at 
least one SP. Many ESFs were identified in the aforementioned tender specifications 
and national and international public procurement review. Classifying all these ESFs 
is similar to classifying different kinds of equations found in mathematics. 
Therefore, it was considered that the best way to create the taxonomic review was to 
classify the ESF according to the SP they actually implemented. The result is shown 
in Figure 1. 
As can be seen, full, dotted and dashed lines represent many combinations of 
specific mathematical expressions that ESFs may use to assign economic scores to 
bids. As will also be noted later, the selection of the SPs to be used by each ESF is 
not trivial and has immediate repercussions on bidders’ competitiveness. 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
Scoring Parameter (SP) relationships 
To understand how an ESF may produce effects on competitive behaviour, it is 
necessary to first understand how the SPs actually behave and how they are 
interconnected. In doing this, several studies have recently made significant 
advances. Of these, Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2012b) first proposed a set of equations 
(specified later in Table 2) that relate each SP to each other in capped tenders with 
 
average curve shapes depicted at the bottom in Figure 2 as a function of the SP mean 
drop md . These curved trajectories seem quite logical, taking into account the two 
boundary price conditions of capped tenders (represented with symbol  in the 
graph). These types of tenders are upper-limited by A  and below by 0, so that, if 
expressed in drops, bids are 10 ≤≤ id . These particular boundaries force the SP to 
coincide at points ( )0,0  and ( )1,1 , with the exception of σ  at ( )0,1 . 
By understanding the capped SP relationships, it is easy to obtain the uncapped 
SP relationships too by means of the graph at the top. This is of course a simpler 
case with only one boundary condition, which is shared with the graph as 
represented by symbol . Therefore the SP in uncapped tenders should follow the 
linear relationships depicted at the top of Figure 2. These relationships are not 
deterministic since SP have statistical variation around their average curves. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
However, despite seeming logical, the uncapped SP relationships inferred require 
a demonstration. In order to do so, Ballesteros-Pérez's (2010) actual uncapped 
construction tender database is used. This dataset comprises 45 tenders of Design, 
Build and Operation of Waste Water Treatment Plants and Sewage Systems 
contracts from northern Spain awarded between 2007 and 2008. The dataset includes 
all bidders’ bids from which calculating the Scoring Parameters (SP) mean bid ( mb ), 
minimum bid ( minb ), maximum bid ( maxb ) and the standard deviation of bids ( s ) is 
straightforward. The dataset also includes one bidder’s cost estimates ( ob ) for 14 
tenders. 
The most representative results of the SP curve calculations can be seen in Figure 
3 and Table 1 along with the coefficients of determination ( 2R ). 2R  values close to 1 
 
confirm that the SPs relationships deduced from the capped tender case point in the 
right direction. 
< Insert Figure 3 here > 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
Furthermore, it is emphasized that the curves depicted in Figures 2 and 3 are 
expressed as a function of some regression parameters: named a, b and c in 
uncapped tenders, and α, β and γ in capped tenders.  Therefore, by analysing the 
variation of these regression parameters over time, it is possible to study how 
aggressively or conservatively the bidders bid in a particular context: with the same 
ESF and ALBC for instance, or even according to a country’s particular economic 
situation. 
Additional details of how these regression parameters are calculated when a 
number of n tenders is analysed for capped tenders can be found in Ballesteros-Pérez 
and Skitmore (2014) and summarised for the first time for both capped and uncapped 
tenders in Table 2. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
This Table, despite representing a collective model (i.e., not taking into account 
the bidders’ identities), provides an important step towards understanding both the 
ESF and the way bidders behave in a particular tender. 
 
ESF graphical representation 
In order to finish describing the most representative features of ESF it is worth 
mentioning that ESF can be represented in several different ways. The first, which 
could be called the classic way, consists of representing the ESF variation in a graph 
 
with axes expressed in bids ib  or drops id  (X –axis) and score iS  (Y-axis). This is 
the kind of representation chosen for the 16 graphs shown in Figure 1. 
Another recent approach to represent ESF is by iso-Score Curve Graphs (iSCG) 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012a) in which the X-axis usually represents one of the 
SP, the Y-axis represents any bidder’s bid or drop ( ib  or id ), while the curves 
represent the combination of ( )YX ,  points in which the ESF provides the same level 
of score to a bidder’s bid or drop. 
These iSCG have the advantage of showing the whole picture of how any ESF 
reacts as a function of both the SPs themselves and as a function of the bidders’ past 
encounters, which suggests applications in competitive bidding issues again and a 
new way to interpret ESF effects on bidding behaviour. 
 
Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC) taxonomy 
In parallel with reviewing the prominent features of ESF and its parameters, the 
ALBC expressions were also analysed. Abnormally Low Bid Criteria (ALBC) have 
the task of setting a cut-off bid ( abnb ) or drop ( abnd ) that disqualifies any bidder 
whose bid is cheaper (unless the bidder is capable of justifying this price (EU, 
2004)). 
There is a number of existing systems in use by many countries that are intended 
to detect abnormally low bids. The most recurring example essentially consists of 
arithmetic systems that measure the deviation of a particular bid from the average of 
all bids submitted, with minor differences in the percentage and/or calculation of the 
average (for instance Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece use ranges 
mostly varying between 10% and 15%) (EU, 1999). However, as the EU 
Commission reports (EU, 1999), there is to date no systematic method that enables 
 
the effective evaluation of ALBC in EMAT or BV auctions, since the systems 
currently in use are recognized to be of limited efficacy. 
Of the tender specifications analysed, six generic ALBC were identified. Some 
are applicable to capped tenders only and others for both capped and uncapped 
tenders. Basically, there are two groups of ALBC: those that make use of a SP (only 
cases of mb / md , s /σ  and N  have been found), and those that do not make use of 
any SP and, therefore, the cut-off limit does not depend on the final bid distribution. 
In these ALBC, the cut-off economic limit can be known in advance, that is, before 
the tender deadline. This also happens to ESF: whenever no SP is used (case 6 in 
Figure 1), the ESF is totally predictable and unmovable, no matter what final bids are 
submitted. 
The six ALBC, the first four of which are expressed as a function of one SP and 
the last two as a function of no SP whatsoever, are then: 
( ) mabn bb ε−= 1  Possible in both capped and uncapped tenders. Basically, it is the 
most common criterion in EU countries, with a parameter ε  that 
is usually set between 0.05 and 0.20. Any bid that fulfils the 
condition abni bb <  will be ruled out as inadmissible. 
( ) mabn dd θ+= 1  Possible in capped tenders only. This uses a multiple of the 
average drop such that all bidders with a higher drop ( abni dd > ) 
will be not considered. Parameter θ  also usually ranges between 
0.05 and 0.20. Perhaps, as found many times in the literature, it is 
interesting to point out that, whenever the expression of abnd  
comes from the translation of the previous ALBC as a function of 
ε , then ( )( )mabn dd −+−= 111 ε  
 
sbb mabn λ−=  Possible in both uncapped (under the expression on the left) and 
uncapped tenders (under the translated expression 
σλ+= mabn dd ). It sets a threshold in bid or drop standard 
deviation multiples, beyond which all bidders are disqualified. 
Parameter λ  usually ranges between 0.5 and 2. 
( )
2
1 NNabn µ−=  Possible for capped and uncapped tenders. Basically, this ALBC 
directly eliminates a proportion µ  of bidders just for being 
located at the extremes (in one or in both extremes: lowest and 
highest). µ  usually ranges between 0.05 and 0.25. Finally, there 
is another variation of this ALBC by which a pre-set number of 
bidders ( η=abnN ) is disqualified (no matter how many bidders 
are actually competing). 
ω=abnb  Useful for capped and uncapped tenders. This makes no use of SP 
so it is a deterministic cut-off limit for a particular economic 
amount the auctioneer considers too low to be acceptable. As 
happens with the rest of ALBC expressions, this limit has to be 
included in the tender specifications, otherwise it does not 
comply with the principles of transparency, publicity and equality 
of opportunity. Parameter ω  is generally chosen depending on the 
particular tender economic volume and/or the engineer’s 
estimate. 
δ=abnd  Similar to the previous ALBC, but only applicable for capped 
tenders. This sets a drop value above which any bidder’s drop 
 
will be disqualified. Parameter δ  is generally set within the range 
0.10 to 0.30. 
All these ALBC are interconnected, that is, it is possible to find a mathematical 
equivalency between the proportion of bidders disqualified in the first four ALBC 
(the ones that use a SP) and between the last two ALBC (the ones that make no use 
of any SP). This equivalency has been proposed in the Appendix by means of Tables 
3 and 4, respectively. However those calculations require knowing the exact bid 
probability distribution function, which has been an unsolved and ongoing research 
bidding topic over the years. In this connection Skitmore (2013) reports some of the 
most common found in the scientific literature, such as uniform, normal, lognormal, 
gamma and Weibull. For a first approach, however, Tables 3 and 4 assume a simple 
Uniform distribution. 
A last relevant practical note concerning ALBC found during the tender review was 
that, when competing with ALBC mathematical expressions that make no use of SPs 
(expressions ω=abnb  and δ=abnd ), most  bids tend to be close to the cut-off limit (
ω  or δ ), apparently sacrificing bigger profits. 
Mathematically this can be simply explained for uncapped tenders as, when ω→mb , 
therefore, ω→minb  (otherwise the lowest bidder is directly disqualified) and the 
maximum bid has no option but ω→maxb . Then, since 0minmax →−bb , so does the 
standard deviation 0→s . Analogously, 0→abnN  (because everyone knows where 
the cut-off limit is located), therefore, mb  is stuck near ω  making impossible to 
establish a statistical relationship with the rest of ALBC which make use of SP (first 
four shown in this section). 
In capped tenders, a similar reasoning process may arise: δ→md  and so do 
δ→maxd  and δ→mind , forcing 0→σ , whereas 0→abnN  as well. 
 
This situation has immediate practical repercussions since it constitutes the first 
empirical proof that when bidders can accurately calculate the risk of being 
disqualified (because they know in advance where exactly ω  or δ  are), most will 
place their bids just before crossing that extreme. In this way, bidders avoid losing as 
much economic score as possible, despite frequently relinquishing more profits 
compared to situations in which the ALBC depends on a SP and the final position of 
the cut-off limit is not known in advance. 
 
Discussion 
In addition to the review of tender specifications, literature and public procurement 
methods allowing the ESF and ALBC taxonomies to be created, several other 
interesting issues on bidding behaviour have emerged. For example, how SPs relate 
to each other (summarized in Table 2), how bid distribution concentrates near the 
cut-off limit when the ALBC makes no use of SP, and how the ALBC are 
mathematically interconnected (shown in the Appendix). Another recurrent effect of 
apparent or phony economic bid weighting takes place whenever a percentage of the 
economic score ( iS ) is either never achievable or always awarded.  
To introduce this phenomenon, suppose the economic and technical bid weightings 
in a tender are balanced ( 5.0== te WW ) and that the tender specifications adopt an 
ESF that gives away 0.30 (out of the total 1.00) no matter the bid or drop the bidder 
is submitting. An example of this ESF would be: 
minmax
max70.030.0
bb
bbS ii −
−
+=      or     
minmax
min70.030.0
dd
ddS ii −
−
+=  
In this case, bidders can only compete to achieve an economic score from 0.30 to 
1.00. In other terms, the following fraction of the Overall Score, iO , 
 
15.05.030.030.0 =⋅=⋅ eW  is not disputed. If this happens, the true economic bid 
weighting ( *eW ) is not now 0.5, but ( )30.01−eW  out of the Overall possible Score 
( ) te WW +− 30.01 ; that is, 
( )
( )
( )
( ) =+−
−
=
+−
−
5.030.015.0
30.015.0
30.01
30.01
te
e
WW
W
412.0
5.035.0
35.0
≈
+
= , which forces the true technical bid weighting ( *tW ) to be 
588.0412.011 * =−≈− eW , instead of 0.5. This is a significant deviation from 
the situation in which the weightings were intended to be balanced. 
This phenomenon can be generalized, even for the technical bid weighting, and 
takes place not only whenever a fraction of the economic score ( Q ) is given away 
by the ESF, but also when a fraction of the score is unreachable mathematically or at 
least unreachable (undisputed) in normal conditions of competitiveness. In these 
cases, the general expression for calculating the true economic bid weighting is: 
 ( )
( )QWW
QWW
et
e
e −+
−
=
1
1*  (3) 
If et WW −=1  then, 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( )
e
e
ee
e
e QW
WQ
QWW
QWW
−
−
=
−+−
−
=
1
1
11
1*  (4) 
where: 
eW : is the original Economic Bid Weighting (in per-unit values) stated in the tender 
specifications. 
*
eW : is the true Economic Bid Weighting (in per-unit values) with ee WW ≤*  always. 
Q : is the Fraction of the Economic Score either rarely or almost always achievable 
(in per-unit values). 
 
tW : is the original Technical Bid Weighting (in per-unit values) stated in the tender 
specifications. 
*
tW : is the true Technical Bid Weighting (in per-unit values) with 
** 1 et WW −= . 
A representation of Equation 4 can be found in Figure 4 for all the intervening 
variables. 
< Insert Figure 4 here > 
Using the diagram above is quite simple. Generally, the user must enter by the 
lower X-axis through analysing the ESF and estimating Q  , then select the curve 
eW  corresponding to the value stated in the tender specifications and find the 
position of the vertical intersection with which obtaining the true economic ( *eW ) 
and technical ( ** 1 et WW −= ) bid weighting values on the left and right, respectively. 
Practical implications of both Equation 4 and Figure 4 are evident. If tender 
specifications implement ESFs with mathematical expressions that do not allow 
awarding the whole range of economic scores (from 0 to 1) to the competing bidders, 
the economic and technical bid weightings will become increasingly reversed ( eW  
will lose actual weight in favour of the technical bid weighting tW ) as the fraction of 
undisputed economic score increases. This situation could mislead bidders’ 
strategies, or even be used (intentionally or unintentionally) by the Contracting 
Authorities to give the appearance of applying some economic and technical bid 
weightings while actually applying different ones.  
However, perhaps, the most difficult issue is to estimate Q , since not all ESF are 
as simple as the one provided in the example. For this purpose, the bidders or 
Contracting authorities can make use of the SP Estimated cost bid ( ob ) or drop ( od ) 
 
from a future tender for forecasting the rest of SP (by means of Table 2) and, with 
these values, calculate the final ESF curve, with which observing Q  is trivial. 
In general, any owner or auctioneer, when designing and implementing a new 
ESF for future tender specifications should bear in mind that the “whole range” of 
possible scores (from 0.00 to 1.00) must always be actually achievable by the 
bidders in normal conditions of competitiveness. Nonetheless, strictly speaking, this 
can only be possible by implementing an ESF under the cases 4 or 5 of the ESF 
taxonomy in Figure 1, since they are the only ones that award the maximum score (
1max =S ) to the lowest bidder (that is, to SP minb  or maxd ) and the minimum score 
( 0min =S ) to the highest bidder (that is, to maxb  or mind ). From this last statement, 
it is clear that specific ESFs that make no use of any SP (cases 6 in Figure 1) are the 
most vulnerable to apparent economic bid weighting.  
However, the problem with cases 4 and 5 is that these ESFs are the most 
vulnerable to collusion, particularly cover-bidding, in which bidding rings can 
greatly condition the final economic scores (by submitting extremely high and/or 
low bids for pushing the rest of the bidders’ scores towards the average, thus also 
paradoxically diminishing the economic bid weighting). 
In this sense, all the combinations of SPs from Figure 1 would actually require an 
ALBC to be implemented for both the high and lower extremes of the bid 
distribution with the simultaneous aim of avoiding bid-covering. The key is how to 
set the right ALBC width: narrow enough to make collusion difficult, but not so 
narrow so as to reject bids that are actually competitive and truthful. Obviously, the 
problem of reaching the perfect configuration and combination of ESF and ALBC 
still requires further research, but has now acquired a new dimension by highlighting 
how apparent or phony bid weighting is also an important effect to be considered in 
seeking a solution. 
 
 Conclusions 
Whenever there is need for converting price bids into scores for combination with 
technical proposal attributes, such as quality or client’s preferences (like MEAT and 
BV), mathematical criteria need to be included in the tender specifications. The 
classification of these mathematical criteria, named Economic Scoring Formulas 
(ESFs) and Abnormally Low Bids Criteria (ALBC), constituted the main aim of the 
present study. 
By going through their taxonomies it is clear that there are many ESFs and 
ALBC currently in use for evaluating price bid proposals in construction auctions 
and they affect bidding behaviour in profound ways, most of which are little 
understood. As a result, their design in practice is invariably a highly intuitive 
process, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations. 
In this paper, several outcomes relating to ESFs and ALBC have been considered 
and analysed. After a wide but thorough review of international tender specifications 
along with multiple other sources such as international public procurement 
guidelines and scientific articles and books on the topic, new ESF and ALBC 
taxonomies have been proposed. These taxonomies will enable expanding research 
in the near future while establishing a reasonable degree of homogeneity concerning 
nomenclature and denominations. 
Furthermore, because of classifying the ESF and ALBC according to their 
Scoring Parameters (SP) actually used, their relationships have now been adduced 
for uncapped tenders (tenders without an upper-price limitation). This will be useful 
for analysing changes or habits in bidding behaviour in upcoming research since they 
can accurately depict recurring statistical information on tenders. 
 
Additionally, several other results derived from the ESF and ALBC taxonomies 
have been obtained. For example, it has been explained how bid distribution 
concentrates near the cut-off limit when the ALBC makes no use of a SP, as well as 
how ALBC are actually mathematically interrelated whenever a SP is used. 
Finally, apparent or phony economic bid weighting explains how the economic 
bid weighting is actually overestimated whenever an ESF does not assign the whole 
range of scores to all the participating bidders. This phenomenon is quite common in 
ESF in real-practice and has to be avoided when designing both ESF and ALBC. 
From the several examples provided in the paper, it is clear that previous 
research on auction design is still very far from incorporating important practical 
issues, some of which have been described here. The main contribution here is a 
compilation and perhaps a first step towards a new approach in bidding analysis 
useful to both auctioneers and bidders. This is especially that case with the former 
when designing or selecting a particular combination of ESF and ALBC for the 
tender specifications. However, the present analysis is mostly restricted to providing 
a general qualitative picture. The next logical research step will be the development 
of a quantitative means for determining, and hence controlling, the effect of small 
variations in the ESF and/or ALBC mathematical expressions on, for instance, the 
level of bidders’ aggressiveness-conservativeness in a future tender. Taken together 
with the risk attitudes of the individuals involved, a new door is opened for the 
possibility of a personalized optimal price scoring rules in construction auction 
design. 
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Appendix 
The following tables allow the conversion of one ALBC to another assuming the 
bid distribution follows a Uniform distribution, which constitutes a simplification of 
the reality. Depending on which is the known ALBC expression, locate that column 
and go down until reaching the same row where the text “independent variable” can 
be read. The rest of the ALBC expressions into which the initial known ALBC 
expression can be translated will remain in the same row in adjacent cells. 
For the interested reader, mathematical proofs (❶-⓮) of Table 3 and 4 can be 
found as Supplemental online material 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
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Primary Scoring Parameters (SPs) 
bmin : Minimum bid (lowest bid) 
bm  : Mean bid (average bid) 
bmax : Maximum bid (highest bid) 
dmax : Maximum drop (lowest bid) 
dm  : Mean drop (average bid) 
dmin : Minimum drop (highest bid) 
 
*Secondary SPs, such as N and s or σ, have 
not been considered for the sake of simplicity 
 
Independent variables (X-axis) 
bi : Monetary bid (in uncapped tenders) 
di : Per-unit drop (in capped tenders) 
 
 Dependent variables (Y-axis) 
Si : Bidder i’s economic score calculated by 
 the Economic Scoring Formula 
S(1) : Maximum Score (generally assigned to the 
 lowest bidder and equals 1) 
S(avg) : Score assigned to the mean bid bm 
 (generally not equals 0.5) 
S(N) : Minimum Score (generally assigned to the 
 highest bidder and equals 0) 
 
Economic Scoring Rule Curves 
 Linear / bi-linear criteria 
            /  Curvilinear criteria 
Figure 1. Economic Scoring Formulae taxonomy as a function of their Scoring Parameters 
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Figure 2. Major Scoring Parameter (SP) relationships in capped and uncapped tenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Figure 3. Scoring Parameter (SP) relationships in an uncapped construction tender dataset 
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 Figure 4. Apparent economic bid weighting variation 
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Actual Scoring Parameter (SP) values from the original 45 tenders Table 2 (2nd column) Calculated according Table 2 (1st column) 
ID bo bmin bm bmax s N a b c ID est. bmin est. bmax est. s est. bo 
1 5,702,262 4,897,082 5,450,186 6,131,465 361,268 13 0.899 1.125 1.046 1 4,901,406 5,965,979 415,725 5,884,521 
2 714,225 724,993 775,167 818,247 48,387 4 0.935 1.056 0.921 2 697,116 848,527 44,867 836,942 
3   264,537 287,515 307,227 14,807 14 0.920 1.069   3 258,565 314,724 14,219   
4   115,979 122,657 126,270 5,790 3 0.946 1.029   4 110,306 134,265 5,942   
5 1,365,910 1,012,084 1,082,862 1,170,446 57,705 11 0.935 1.081 1.261 5 973,828 1,185,342 54,858 1,169,157 
6 879,023 685,135 713,584 744,935 27,504 5 0.960 1.044 1.232 6 641,733 781,115 25,894 770,450 
7 965,533 820,075 883,144 916,683 36,662 6 0.929 1.038 1.093 7 794,220 966,722 39,044 953,523 
8 4,190,581 3,449,084 3,885,370 4,501,876 233,182 22 0.888 1.159 1.079 8 3,494,151 4,253,072 332,859 4,195,002 
9   2,845,414 3,080,428 3,347,952 191,483 10 0.924 1.087   9 2,770,259 3,371,952 177,308   
10 1,276,480 989,040 1,077,819 1,187,773 60,353 25 0.918 1.102 1.184 10 969,293 1,179,821 62,150 1,163,712 
11   196,663 229,253 248,081 16,976 11 0.858 1.082   11 206,170 250,949 17,812   
12   5,066,621 5,959,673 7,030,823 517,085 43 0.850 1.180   12 5,359,592 6,523,682 594,017   
13   5,752,980 6,664,934 7,803,728 552,845 43 0.863 1.171   13 5,993,840 7,295,687 620,190   
14   13,229,417 14,894,721 16,578,018 1,158,373 12 0.888 1.113   14 13,394,968 16,304,321 1,142,414   
15   15,854,287 18,027,863 19,811,686 1,239,358 23 0.879 1.099   15 16,212,633 19,733,976 1,246,257   
16   7,532,621 8,625,632 9,768,072 648,213 39 0.873 1.132   16 7,757,115 9,441,941 679,283   
17   323,376 364,765 416,617 24,482 18 0.887 1.142   17 328,037 399,285 30,083   
18 2,119,811 1,739,817 1,856,797 2,045,096 86,955 14 0.937 1.101 1.142 18 1,669,836 2,032,520 101,684 2,004,768 
19   3,115,326 3,363,910 3,556,584 166,633 6 0.926 1.057   19 3,025,197 3,682,262 178,333   
20   4,715,326 6,062,617 7,016,838 655,983 45 0.778 1.157   20 5,452,171 6,636,369 694,589   
21 1,398,605 1,185,908 1,286,376 1,363,499 63,557 7 0.922 1.060 1.087 21 1,156,850 1,408,115 68,355 1,388,889 
22   1,153,250 1,275,801 1,379,826 60,650 19 0.904 1.082   22 1,147,341 1,396,540 72,674   
23 1,391,729 1,220,847 1,260,234 1,296,154 31,301 4 0.969 1.029 1.104 23 1,133,341 1,379,500 36,232 1,360,665 
24 4,578,381 3,963,763 4,289,341 4,711,201 200,837 22 0.924 1.098 1.067 24 3,857,446 4,695,274 236,316 4,631,166 
25   1,626,951 2,179,868 2,602,736 224,859 25 0.746 1.194   25 1,960,377 2,386,166 305,158   
26   402,918 433,576 449,665 14,387 9 0.929 1.037   26 389,919 474,608 16,868   
27 5,822,694 5,114,302 5,719,436 6,343,885 347,329 16 0.894 1.109 1.018 27 5,143,545 6,260,710 402,277 6,175,228 
28   6,310,437 6,927,068 7,406,163 374,692 10 0.911 1.069   28 6,229,580 7,582,628 386,600   
29   4,361,422 4,749,403 5,291,885 348,740 9 0.918 1.114   29 4,271,185 5,198,875 335,752   
30   6,344,781 7,312,009 8,743,060 608,123 27 0.868 1.196   30 6,575,761 8,004,000 745,579   
31   918,054 987,694 1,043,243 63,773 3 0.929 1.056   31 888,242 1,081,166 72,278   
32   1,534,762 1,616,923 1,718,210 75,920 6 0.949 1.063   32 1,454,115 1,769,945 74,140   
33 2,676,422 2,357,470 2,536,349 2,744,372 145,192 9 0.929 1.082 1.055 33 2,280,964 2,776,383 139,612 2,738,476 
34 636,369 555,494 771,586 878,669 91,272 9 0.720 1.139 0.825 34 693,895 844,607 116,616 833,075 
35   263,641 277,774 287,344 8,700 5 0.949 1.034   35 249,805 304,062 10,263   
36   2,634,847 3,071,591 3,359,343 232,485 9 0.858 1.094   36 2,762,312 3,362,279 261,430   
37   975,812 1,002,202 1,036,119 30,850 3 0.974 1.034   37 901,290 1,097,048 34,818   
38   305,270 380,479 432,013 39,886 12 0.802 1.135   38 342,169 416,487 43,240   
39   192,669 201,402 209,590 5,992 5 0.957 1.041   39 181,123 220,463 7,327   
40   653,260 713,573 816,069 45,191 12 0.915 1.144   40 641,724 781,104 55,544   
41   1,612,924 1,708,144 1,778,198 48,210 8 0.944 1.041   41 1,536,150 1,869,798 61,342   
42   1,059,343 1,243,280 1,439,521 89,446 20 0.852 1.158   42 1,118,094 1,360,941 121,300   
43   1,520,757 1,764,662 1,928,426 144,439 11 0.862 1.093   43 1,586,978 1,931,665 141,221   
44   289,842 308,259 323,608 15,109 4 0.940 1.050   44 277,221 337,432 16,246   
45   2,378,881 2,612,412 2,831,442 189,587 5 0.911 1.084   45 2,349,368 2,859,645 195,965   
     Average= 14.133 0.899 1.095 1.080 R²= 0.998 0.999 0.989 0.996 
Table 1. Scoring Parameter relationship calculations for the uncapped construction tender dataset 
Uncapped Tenders Capped Tenders 
Mean (average) bid 
mb  
+∞≤≤ mb0  
 
( )Adb ii −= 1  
(whenever A exists) 
 
Regression 
coefficients 
Mean (average) drop 
md  
10 ≤≤ md  
A
bd ii −=1  
 
Regression 
coefficients 
Minimum (lowest) bid 
minb  
mbabest ⋅=min  
∑
=
=
=
nk
k km
k
b
b
n
a
1
min1  
10 ≤≤ a  
(bid aggressiveness    bid conservativeness) 
(bid dispersion    bid concentration) 
Maximum drop (lowest bid) 
maxd  
α
mbdest =max  
(potential expression) 
(Parabolic relationship expressions are also 
found in Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2012a)) 
∑
=
=
=
nk
k km
k
dLN
dLN
n 1
max1α  
10 ≤≤α  
(bid aggressiveness    bid conservativeness) 
(bid dispersion    bid concentration) 
Maximum (highest) bid 
maxb  
mbbbest ⋅=max  
∑
=
=
=
nk
k km
k
b
b
n
b
1
max1  
+∞≤≤ b1  
 (bid concentration    bid dispersion) 
Minimum drop (highest bid) 
mind  
β
mbdest =min  
(potential expression) 
(Parabolic relationship expressions are also 
found in Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2012a)) 
∑
=
=
=
nk
k km
k
dLN
dLN
n 1
min1β  
+∞≤≤ β1  
 (bid concentration    bid dispersion) 
Bid standard deviation 
s  
321
1 minmax bb
N
N
sest
−
⋅
−
+
=
=
 
∑
=
=
=
nk
k
kNn
N
1
1  
(N is the average of the participating bidders 
in the n past tenders analyzed)  
 
(bmin  and bmax  are obtained as above) 
Drop standard deviation 
σ  
321
1 minmax dd
N
N
est
−
⋅
−
+
=
=σ
 
∑
=
=
=
nk
k
kNn
N
1
1  
(N is the average of the participating bidders 
in the n past tenders analyzed)  
 
(dmin  and dmax  are obtained as above) 
Estimated cost bid 
ob  
mo bcbest ⋅=  
(This expression is commonly used the other 
way around, i.e., as a function of bo  which 
actually is the Forecasting Parameter) 
∑
=
=
=
nk
k km
ko
b
b
n
c
1
1  
+∞≤≤ c0  
(bid conservativeness    bid aggressiveness) 
Estimated cost drop 
od  
( )11 −+= mo ddest γ  
(This expression is also commonly used the 
other way around, i.e., as a function of do ) 
∑
=
= −
−
=
nk
k km
ok
d
d
n 1 1
11γ  
+∞≤≤ γ0  
(bid conservativeness    bid aggressiveness) 
Table 2. Mathematical relationships of Scoring Parameters (SP) in capped and uncapped tenders 
( ) mabn bb ε−= 1  ( ) mabn dd θ+= 1  
sbb mabn λ−=
σλ+= mabn dd  
( )
2
1 NNabn µ−=  
Generally: 
10 ≤≤ ε  
(from tougher to softer) 
 
Generally: 
m
m
d
d−
≤≤
10 θ  
(from tougher to softer) 
 
Generally: 
σ
λ mm dor
s
b −
≤≤
10  
(from tougher to softer) 
 
For uncapped and capped 
tenders, respectively: 
abN
N
s
bm
−
⋅
+
−
=
32
1
1  
βασ mm
mm
dd
d
N
Nd
−
−
⋅
+
−
=
− 1
1
132
1  
Generally: 
10 ≤≤ µ  
(from tougher to softer) 
 
If Nabn was defined as a 
Natural number η, this would 
be the equivalency: 
N
η
µ
21−=  
Actual mathematical limits: 
1≤<∞− ε  
 
ε=0 disqualifies N/2 bidders 
Actual mathematical limits:
m
m
d
d−
≤<−
11 θ  
 
θ=0 disqualifies N/2 bidders 
Actual mathematical limits:
s
bm≤<∞− λ  
σ
λ
σ
mm dd −≤<− 1  
λ=0 disqualifies N/2 bidders 
Actual mathematical limits:
11 ≤<− µ  
 
μ=-1 disqualif. the N bidders 
μ=0 disqualifies N/2 bidders 
μ=1 disqualifies no bidder 
ε  
(independent variable) m
m
bT
Ab
−
⋅−
=
ε
θ ❶ 
abN
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
32
1
1 ελ ❷ 
abN
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
εµ 2
1
1
❸ 
321
10 ab
N
NifN abn
−
⋅
−
+
≥= ε  
↑<≤≤< ε0
2
0 ifNN abn
 
θε ⋅
−
=
m
m
b
bA
❹ θ  
(independent variable) 
βα
θλ
mm
m
dd
d
N
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
32
1
1
❺ 
βα
θµ
mm
m
dd
d
N
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
2
1
1
❻ 
m
mm
abn d
dd
N
NifN
21
10
βα
θ
−
⋅
−
+
≥=
↑<≤≤< θ0
2
0 ifNN abn
 
λε ⋅−⋅
−
+
=
321
1 ab
N
N
❼ 
321
1 λθ
βα
⋅
−
⋅
−
+
=
m
mm
d
dd
N
N
❽
 λ  
(independent variable) 
3
λµ = ❾ 
30 ≥= λifN abn
30
2
0 <≤≤< λifNN abn
 
µε ⋅−⋅
−
+
=
21
1 ab
N
N
❿ µθ
βα
⋅
−
⋅
−
+
=
m
mm
d
dd
N
N
21
1
⓫
 3µλ = ⓬ µ  
(independent variable) 
 
Table 3. Mathematical conversion among Abnormally Low Bids Criteria (ALBC) with Scoring 
Parameters (SPs) assuming that the bid distribution is a Uniform distribution 
ω=abnb  δ=abnd  
+∞≤≤ω0  
(from softer to tougher) 
10 ≤≤ δ  
(from tougher to softer) 
ω  
(independent variable) A
ωδ −= 1 ⓭ 
( )Aδω −= 1 ⓮ δ  
(independent variable) 
 
Table 4. Mathematical conversion among Abnormally Low Bids Criteria (ALBC) with no 
Scoring Parameter (SP) implementation assuming that the bid distribution is a Uniform 
distribution 
Supplemental online material 
 
Table A1 proofs 
 
❶ By definition ( ) mabn bb ε+= 1 , if we transform the expression to drops, we 
obtain: ( ) ( )( )AdAd mabn −+=− 111 ε . By working out abnd  we reach 
( )( )mabn dd −−−= 111 ε . By equalling the latter expression to ( ) mabn dd θ+= 1 , 
we conclude that 
m
m
bT
Ab
−
⋅−
=
εθ  
❷ By equalling expressions ( ) mabn bb ε+= 1  and sbb mabn λ−= , we obtain 
sbm λε = . Since 
( )
321
1
321
1 minmax mbab
N
Nbb
N
Ns −⋅
−
+
=
−
⋅
−
+
= , by replacing s  we 
obtain 
abN
N
s
bm
−
⋅
+
−
==
32
1
1 εελ  
❸ If we are assuming the N  bidders are uniformly distributed within a Lower 
Bound ( LB ) and an Upper Bound (UB ), and since uniform distribution standard 
deviation equals 
32
LBUBs −==s , then, the distance between the LB  and the 
UB , that is LBUB − , is 32s  or 32s . In other words, the N bidders will be 
found within the interval ( )3,3 sbsb mm +− , and half of them ( 2N ) within 
( )mm bsb ,3− . Therefore, the distance 3s  in uncapped tenders or 3s in 
capped tenders comprises 2
N  bidders, which make obvious that the number of 
disqualified bidders for being too low ( abnN ) follows the subsequent expression:
23
1 NNabn 





−=
λ . 
 
By proof 2 we know that 
abN
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
32
1
1 ελ , and by replacing the latter in the last 
but one, we obtain: 
2
2
1
11 N
abN
NNabn 





−
⋅
+
−
−=
ε . Since, by definition 
( )
2
1 NNabn µ−= , it is obvious that, by equalling the last two expressions the 
result is 
abN
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
εµ 2
1
1 . 
By replacing 0=µ  and 1=µ  in the latter, the limits where 2/N  and no bidders 
are disqualified become trivial. 
❹ By definition ( ) mabn dd θ+= 1 , if we transform the expression to bids, we obtain: 
( ) 




 ++=−
A
b
A
b mabn 111 θ . By working out abnb  we reach ( )mmabn bAbb −−= θ . 
By equalling the latter expression to ( ) mabn bb ε+= 1 , we conclude that 
θε
m
m
b
bA −
=  
❺ By equalling expressions ( ) mabn dd θ+= 1  and λs+= mabn dd , we obtain 
λsθ =md . Since 321
1
321
1 minmax
βa
s mm dd
N
Ndd
N
N −
⋅
−
+
=
−
⋅
−
+
= , by replacing s  
we obtain βa
θ
s
θλ
mm
mm
dd
d
N
Nd
−
⋅
+
−
==
32
1
1  
❻ Since in proof 3 it was justified that 
23
1 NNabn 




 −=
λ , and according to proof 
5 we have: βa
θλ
mm
m
dd
d
N
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
32
1
1 . By substituting we reach 
2
2
1
11 N
dd
d
N
NN
mm
m
abn 





−
⋅
+
−
−= βa
θ . 
 
By definition ( )
2
1 NNabn µ−= , then, by equalling both last expressions we 
obtain: βa
θµ
mm
m
dd
d
N
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
2
1
1 . 
By replacing 0=µ  and 1=µ  in the latter, the limits where 2/N  and no bidders 
are disqualified become trivial. 
❼ By equalling expressions ( ) mabn bb ε+= 1  and sbb mabn λ−= , we obtain 
sbm λε = . 
Since ( )
321
1
321
1 minmax mbab
N
Nbb
N
Ns −⋅
−
+
=
−
⋅
−
+
= , by replacing s  we obtain 
λλε ⋅−⋅
−
+
==
321
1 ab
N
N
b
s
m
 
❽ By equalling expressions ( ) mabn dd θ+= 1  and λs+= mabn dd , we obtain 
λsθ =md . 
Since 
321
1
321
1 minmax
βa
s mm dd
N
Ndd
N
N −
⋅
−
+
=
−
⋅
−
+
= , by replacing s  we obtain 
321
1 λλsθ
βa
⋅
−
⋅
−
+
==
m
mm
m d
dd
N
N
d
 
❾ Since in proof 3 it was justified that 
23
1 NNabn 




 −=
λ , and, by definition, 
( )
2
1 NNabn µ−= , on equalling both expressions we directly obtain 3
λµ = . 
By replacing 0=µ  and 1=µ  in the latter, the limits where 2/N  and no bidders 
are disqualified become trivial. 
❿ By proof 3 we know that 
baN
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
εµ 2
1
1 , then µε ⋅−⋅
−
+
=
21
1 ab
N
N  
 
⓫ By proof 6 we know that βa
θµ
mm
m
dd
d
N
N
−
⋅
+
−
=
2
1
1 , then µθ
βa
⋅
−
⋅
−
+
=
m
mm
d
dd
N
N
21
1  
⓬ By proof 9 we know that 
3
λµ = , then 3µλ =  
Table A2 proofs 
 
⓭ Since ω=abnb , ( )Adb ii −= 1  and δ=abnd , then ( ) ( ) ωδ =−=−= AAdb abnabn 11 . 
That is 
A
dabn
ωδ −== 1  
⓮ By proof 13 we know that 
A
ωδ −=1  and hence ( )Aδω −= 1  
 
 
